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lV

STATEMENT OF TIIE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark D. Beavers appeals from the orders summarily dismissing all but one of the claims
presented in his petition for post-conviction relief, and denying the remaining claim following an
evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
As explained in the trial court's memorandum decision and order on Beavers' motion to
suppress:
Mr. Beavers was arrested at his residence on August 13, 2006 for two counts
of trafficking in marijuana ... and one count of possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to deliver .... The arrest followed a search of Beavers's residence
pursuant to a search warrant issued by Magistrate Judge Wayman. The testifying
officer for the warrant was Officer Eric Paull of the Coeur d'Alene Police
Department.
(Supp. R, p.948.) 1
Beavers' first attorney, Monica Flood Brennan, filed a motion to suppress, partly based on
Beavers' claim that, contrary to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the search warrant issued
was based on false testimony by Detective Paull.

(Supp. R., pp.845-846, 879-892.) After

conducting a Franks hearing involving Beavers' second trial counsel, Fred Loats, the trial court
denied Beavers' motion. (Supp. R., pp.947-962.) At trial, Beavers was found guilty of each of the
charged offenses. (Supp. R., p.1759.) The Idaho Court of Appeal affirmed Beavers' convictions
and sentences in State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180,268 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2010).

1

The Clerk's Record ("R.") has 274 pages. The "Docket No. 45245 (Augmented).pdf' (numbered
1 through 418) and the "Supplemental Information" (numbered pages 419 through 1935) will be
referenced as "Supp. R." due to their continuous page numbering.
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On April 5, 2012, Beavers filed his petition for post-conviction relief. 2 (Supp. R., pp.419430.)

The district court explained the relevant events that followed:
The Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition was filed on May 15, 2013 and
October 30, 2013. The Petitioner filed a Brief in Response to State's Motion for
Summary Dismissal on December 22, 2014 ....
An Opinion and Order on Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal
was filed on January 27, 2015. The Court granted the State's motion to summarily
dismiss all claims set forth in the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, with the
exception of Claim 9(f), whether Attorney Loats was ineffective for failing to
present an expert witness regarding the probability of smelling marijuana.

(R., p.215-216.)
An evidentiary hearing was held on Beavers' remaining claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective at the Franks hearing because he failed to present testimony of an expert who could
testify about the odor emitted by marijuana plants, to show that Detective Paull testified falsely at
the probable cause hearing that he could smell the odor of marijuana emanating from Beavers'
property when he stood at the fence-line of an adjacent house the day before he obtained the search
warrant. (See generally 3/21/17 Tr.) After an evidentiary hearing, the court entered its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (R., pp.215-227), dismissing Beavers' post-conviction
petition in its entirety. Beavers filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.230-237.)

On September 8, 2014, Beavers filed a motion to amend his petition with six new claims of
ineffective assistance, which the court denied, holding that the late filing of the motion would
prejudice the state. (Supp. R., pp.1515-1520, 1645-1646.)

2

2

ISSUES
Beavers states the issues on appeal as:

I.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed, without a twentyday notice period, Mr. Beavers' claim that the prosecution withheld
favorable information, because the district court dismissed it on grounds
independent from those raised by the State?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Beavers'
motion to amend the post-conviction, because the district court did not act
consistently with the applicable legal standards mandating that leave to
amend should be freely given?

III

Did the district court err when it dismissed, after an evidentiary hearing, the
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness
on detecting the smell of marijuana, because Mr. Beavers established
deficiency and prejudice?

(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Beavers failed to show any error in the district court's (1) summary dismissal of his
claim that the prosecution withheld favorable information, (2) denial of his motion to amend his
petition, and (3) the denial of his claim, following an evidentiary hearing, that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to retain an expert to testify about the detection of marijuana through the
sense of smell?

3

ARGUMENT
Beavers Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's (l) Summary Dismissal Of His
Claim That The Prosecution Withheld Favorable Information, (2) Denial Of His Motion To
Amend His Petition, And (3) Denial Of His Claim, Following An Evidentiary Hearing, That His
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Retain An Expert To Testify About The Detection
Of Marijuana Through The Sense Of Smell
A.

Introduction
Beavers argues that the district court erred by (1) summarily dismissing, without proper

notice, his claim that the prosecution withheld information favorable to him, (2) denying his
motion to amend his petition, and (3) denying, following an evidentiary hearing, his claim that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert to testify about the detection of marijuana
through the sense of smell. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-26.) Beavers' arguments fail.

B.

Standards Of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the

evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based. I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,
436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986). A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his burden
of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct.
App. 1990). Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions
of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but
will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v.
State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all
matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d
108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003).

4

C.

The State's Motion For Summary Dismissal Gave Beavers Adequate Notice Of The
Grounds For Dismissing His Claim That The Prosecution Withheld Favorable Information
Beavers contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing claim 7(zl), which

alleged that "[t]he prosecutor withheld information favorable to the defendant," i.e., a stand-alone
Brady claim. 3 (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15; see Supp. R. pp.422-423.) Beavers asserts that,
although the claim was dismissed by the district court on the ground that he failed to provide any
evidence to support it, that claim was not addressed by the State in its motion for summary
dismissal, "and the district court failed to provide the required twenty-day notice period before
dismissing the claim." (Id., p.11.) Although the district court did not give twenty-day notice of
its intent to dismiss the Brady claim on its own motion, the state's motion for summary dismissal
of Beavers' claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain financial records (i.e.,
"favorable information") possessed by the prosecution gave Beavers adequate notice of the ground
for dismissing his Brady claim.
A post-conviction petitioner is entitled to adequate notice of the grounds upon which
dismissal is sought. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010). Notice does
not require the court to "identify with particularity why an applicant's evidence or legal theories
are considered deficient. The notice must provide any deficiency in the applicant's evidence or
any legal analysis that needs to be addressed in order to avoid dismissal of the petition." DeRushe
v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009).
In paragraph 7(zl) of his petition, Beavers alleged, "The prosecutor withheld information
favorable to the defendant." (Supp. R., pp.422-423.) Neither Beavers' petition nor his supporting
affidavit clearly explains what "favorable information" he alleges was withheld by the prosecutor.

See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (Due process requires the prosecution to disclose to
the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state or in its possession.).

3
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The most likely basis for Beavers' Brady claim is set out in his supporting affidavit as follows:
The prosecutor relied heavily on the argument that I could have and should
have sought professional medical attention to deal with my health issues. Evidence
was offered to show that I had bought a home in Coeur d'Alene, was purchasing
land in Washington, had not paid taxes in some years and had no apparent income.
This was prima facie evidence and there was ample evidence to rebutt [sic]
the allegations. The prosecutor was in possession offinancial records, obtained
during the search of my home, dating back to at least 1989, showing that there had
been a financial collapse in my life shortly after the onset of my health problems
and I was struggling under the weight of a crippling amount of debt.

Evidence to rebutt [sic] the prosecutors [sic] allegations was in the hands of
the prosecutor and my first attorney, Monica Flood-Brennan.
(Supp. R., pp.464-465 (emphasis added).)
Assuming that Beaver's Brady claim is that the prosecutor possessed and withheld financial
records obtained during the search of Beavers' home, he received adequate notice of the grounds
for summarily dismissing that claim. (See id.)
Neither one of the state's Brief[s] in Support of Summary Dismissal (see Supp. R., pp.690695, 726-733) specifically mentions Beavers' stand-alone Brady claim as set forth in claim 7(zl)
(see id., pp.422-423). However, in its first Brief in Support of Summary Dismissal, the state
described one of Beavers' "ineffectiveness" claims as asserting that "[ f]inancial records allegedly
in the possession of the prosecutor were never obtained[.]" (R., p.691.) The state argued: "As to
[that claim], he does not specify which records were in the possession of the prosecution;
presumably, since they pertain to the Petitioner, he would have had these records." (R., p.694.)
Beavers' response brief essentially admits that, as asserted by the state, he failed to specify the
records that were withheld by the prosecution, and shows that he had notice of that pleading defect.
(See Supp. R., pp.1746-1747 ("It is clear that information and evidence which should have been

6

disclosed through discovery and under the dictates of Brady ... was withheld by the prosecutor .
. . . [T]his Court has denied all requests to order discovery, thereby preventing Petitioner from
seeking and obtaining further evidence and documentation in order to develop the evidentiary
record and give added support to the evidence establishing prejudice concerning this issue.")
In its summary dismissal order, the district court implicitly viewed Beavers' claim in
paragraph 7(zl) (incorrectly identified as claim 7(z4)) as a stand-alone Brady claim. (See Supp.
R., p.1929, n.14.) Similar to the state's grounds in regard to Beavers' ineffectiveness claim, the
court held that Beavers' Brady claim "provided no evidence supporting his allegation that the
prosecutor withheld evidence favorable to the defendant," and dismissed the claim. (R., p.1929
n.14.)
Beavers was given adequate notice for the grounds for summarily dismissing claim his
Brady claim, claim 7(zl). The state's motion for summary dismissal of the "ineffectiveness" claim
necessarily provided Beavers with sufficient notice as to why his Brady claim was also deficient.
Because the district court dismissed the Brady claim on essentially the same ground, Beavers
received adequate notice regarding the deficiency of his Brady claim. 4 See Baruth v. Gardner, 110
Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986) (when the state files a motion for summary
dismissal, setting forth adequate notice of the grounds for dismissal, and the court grants the state's
motion for the reasons urged by the state, a post-conviction petitioner receives adequate notice of
the grounds for dismissal).
Beavers has failed to show that the district court deprived him of adequate notice of the

4

The state notes that the district court ordered claim 7(zl) summarily dismissed in its order
entered January 27, 2015 - over two years before it held an evidentiary hearing on Beavers'
remaining claim. (See R., pp.215-216.) Beavers could have easily attempted to supply more
specificity to his claim and requested the court to reconsider its summary dismissal of that claim.
7

underlying flaw of his Brady claim; therefore, this Court should affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of that claim.

D.

Beavers Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying
His Motion To Amend His Post-Conviction Petition
Beavers filed his post-conviction petition on April 5, 2012. (Supp. R., pp.419-433.) The

state filed an answer on April 16, 2012. (Supp. R., pp.540-541.) On September 8, 2014, Beavers
moved to amend his post-conviction petition, but instead of amending his original claims, he
attempted to add six new claims alleging that his second attorney, Fred Loats, provided ineffective
assistance for failing to file Brady motions regarding the state's alleged withholding of the
following documents:
Claim 7(z5):

Documentation regarding "trash pick-up events that occurred in the
months preceding the testimony given to obtain the warrant[;]"

Claim 7(z6):

Documentation in the possession of police refuting Detective Paull's
claim that he could detect the odor of growing marijuana from
Beavers' property;

Claim 7(z7)

Copies of literature reviewed by Detective Paull during his training
and education regarding the odor of marijuana that would refute his
testimony given to obtain the warrant;

Claim 7(z8)

"[D]ocuments of Coeur d'Alene Police challenging information in
the falsified Police Incident Report filed by Officer Miller on
8/06/06 [;]"

Claim 7(z9): "[D]ocumentation in possession of the police showing Det. Paull
knew that previous investigations of [Beavers] had concluded there
was no case for probable cause," including "determinations made by
police with respect to [Beavers'] electric bills[;]
Claim 7(zl 0) Police documents showing the difficulties Beavers had with his
neighbor, to challenge "characterizations made by Det. Paull in
testimony given to obtain the warrant."
(Supp. R, pp.1518-1520.)

8

On October 9, 2014, the district court entered an order denying Beavers' motion and
explained:
This case is set for argument on the State's motion for summary disposition
on November 19, 2014. The motion has been pending for a significant period of
time, and has been rescheduled more than once in this case. This Court finds that
the State will be unduly prejudiced if the motion were granted due to the late nature
of the request and the short timeframe before argument is scheduled.
(Supp. R., pp.1645-1646.)
On appeal, Beavers argues that "the district court's references to the timing of the motion
do not explain why the State would be unduly prejudiced, in light of the surrounding
circumstances. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with the applicable standards, which
mandate leave to amend should be freely given." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Contrary to Beavers'
argument, the district court correctly denied his motion to amend because the untimeliness of the
request would have likely prejudiced the state. As an additional or alternative ground to affirm
the court's decision, because Beavers' proposed new claims were untimely under the one-year
limitation of I.C. § 19-4902(a), amendment would have been futile under I.R.C.P. 15(a).
Post-conviction cases are generally governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 215,217,220 P. 3d 571, 573 (2009) (citing McKinney v. State, 133
Idaho 695, 699, 992 P. 2d 144, 148 (1999)). Therefore, a motion to amend a post-conviction
petition is governed by I.R.C.P. 15(a). Pursuant to Rule 15(a), "a party may amend a pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires." The decision to grant or deny a motion to amend is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 217, 220 P. 3d at 573 (2009) (citing Jones v.
Watson, 98 Idaho 606,610,570 P.2d 284,288 (1977)).
In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether
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the district court (1) perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) exercised reason in reaching
its decision. State v. Taylor, 157 Idaho 186,189,335 P.3d 31, 39 (2014) (quoting State v. Cantu,
129 Idaho 673,674,931 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1997)).
Here, the district court perceived that it had the discretion to grant or deny Beavers' motion.
(Supp. R., p.1645 (quoting DAFCO LLC v. Stewart Title Co., 156 Idaho 749, 755, 31 P.3d 491,
497 (2014) (quoting Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119
Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991)).) The district court noted that the motion for summary
dismissal had been pending "for a significant period of time, and ha[ d] been rescheduled more
than once in this case." (Supp. R., p.1645.) It is clear from the record that the court considered
(1) the complex nature of Beavers' six new Brady claims 5 (see Supp. R., pp.1518-1519), and (2)

that the state's motion for summary dismissal, set five to six weeks later, had been pending "a
significant period of time" and continued at least twice. It is reasonable to infer that the district
court determined that the state would likely be prejudiced by having to investigate and prepare to
defend against Beavers' six new Brady-based ineffectiveness claims in such a short period of time
before the summary dismissal hearing. Therefore, the court also acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards, and exercised reason in denying
Beavers' belated motion to amend. Taylor, 157 Idaho at 189,335 P.3d at 39; Cantu, 129 Idaho at
674, 931 P.2d at 1192.
In sum, the district court reasonably and inferentially concluded there was not enough time
for the state to adequately prepare to defend itself (or law enforcement) against the six new claims

5

In his motion to amend, Beavers states, "[t]he issues to be presented in this case are complex."
(Supp. R., p.1517.)
10

Beavers sought to add to his many other claims before oral argument on the state's summary
dismissal motion. Beavers has failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to amend.
Moreover, on appellate review, the district court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of
being upheld on any theory. State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App.
1991). As noted above, the district court correctly denied Beavers' motion to amend the postconviction petition to allege six new Brady claims on the ground that the state would be prejudiced
by the proposed amendment. However, this is not the only basis on which the denial of Beavers'
motion may be upheld; the new causes of action were also time barred and, as such, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the amendment. See Hayward v. Valley Vista Care
Corporation, 136 Idaho 342,346, 33 P.3d 816,820 (2001) (citing Black Canyon Racquetball Club,
Inc. v. Idaho FirstNat'l Bank, 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991)) ("If the opposing
party has [a statute of limitations] defense, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny
the motion to file the amended complaint.").
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be commenced by the
filing of a petition "any time within one ( 1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from
the determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an appeal,
whichever is later." If a party subsequently amends the petition to assert a claim arising "out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading." I.R.C.P. 15(c). "If, however, the
amended pleading sets forth a new cause of action unrelated to the original transaction or
occurrence pled, the amendment does not relate back to the date of the original pleading." Idaho
First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,281, 824 P.2d 841,856 (1991) (citing
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Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc., 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900; Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho
267,688 P.2d 1172 (1984)). Review of the record in this case shows that Beavers' proposed
amendment was untimely.
Beavers filed his initial post-conviction petition on April 5, 2012, approximately 11 1h
months after the Remittitur in his direct appeal was entered. (Supp. R., pp.419-433; see Appendix
A (Remittitur).). Beavers filed his Motion and Affidavit to Amend Petition for Post Conviction
Relief on September 8, 2014 - almost 18 months after he filed his petition. (Supp. R., pp.15151540.) However, none of Beavers' six newly proposed ineffectiveness claims - all based on
different underlying allegations of Brady violations - relate back to any of Beavers' initial claims.
Because the claims Beavers sought to add to his petition were "entirely different from the claim[s]
... contained in the original [petition], and because the new claims relied in part upon new facts
not alleged in the original [petition]," the claims "did not relate back to the time of filing of the
original complaint under I.R.C.P. 15(c), and were barred by the statute of limitations." Black
Canyon Racquetball Club, 119 Idaho at 178, 804 P.2d at 907, quoted in Bliss Valley Foods, 121
Idaho at 282, 824 P.2d at 857.
Because Beavers' six proposed claims did not allege claims upon which relief could be
granted, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Beavers' motion to amend.
See I.R.C.P. 15(c).

E.

Beavers Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Ruling, Following An
Evidentiary Hearing, That He Failed To Show His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not
Retaining An Expert To Testify At The Frank's Hearing About The Detection Of Marijuana
Through The Sense Of Smell
Beavers argues that the district court erred by dismissing, following an evidentiary hearing,

his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use a "marijuana odor" expert at the
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Franks hearing to challenge the credibility of Detective Paull's testimony at the probable cause
hearing that he was able to smell the odor of marijuana as he stood at the fence-line of Beavers'
property the day before obtaining the search warrant. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-25; see R., p.108
("it was strong enough that I immediately recognized it as marijuana").) Beavers' argument fails.

1.

Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims

A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's
performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). "[S]trategic or
tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on
inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 (2008).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,
685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).

2.

Factual Background Of Relevant Trial Court Proceedings

Prior to trial, Beavers filed a motion to suppress, requesting a hearing under Franks v.
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Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), 6 alleging, inter alia, that Detective Eric Paull testified falsely and
either intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, when he testified at the probable cause
hearing (for a search warrant) that he could smell the odor of marijuana coming from Beavers'
property as he stood at the fence-line of the adjacent property of Karin Mitchell. (See generally
Supp. R., pp.845-846, 879-892.) After holding a Franks hearing, the district court held that, despite
finding the detective testified with reckless disregard to the truth about Beavers' power bill
records,7 "the testimony regarding the odor of marijuana was true and accurate[.]" (Supp. R.,
pp.947-962.) The court denied Beavers' suppression motion, concluding that, based on the totality
of circumstances, there was probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search Beavers'
property, explaining:
The neighbor's detection of the odor of marijuana coming from the house
corroborated the officer's detection of the odor of marijuana emanating from the
house .... Officer Paull's detection of marijuana was also corroborated by the tip
and rumors that Defendant had a marijuana growing operation in his home, and
DEA informant's tip that the smell of marijuana had been detected during an earlier
investigation and that Defendant was going to a grow store in Spokane. While
Officer Paull' s attempt at relating the smell of marijuana to the house is strained,
the circumstances were, nevertheless, sufficient to justify a search of the readily
visible greenhouses, as well as Defendant's residence.

6

In Franks v. Delaware, the United States Supreme Court established the following rule, which
was adopted in Idaho:
[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement
is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that
a hearing be held at the defendant's request.
438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); State v. Lindner, 100 Idaho 37, 41,592 P.2d 852,856 (1979).
7

The district court found that the Beavers' utility bill records over the five-year period preceding
the search revealed only one spike of electrical usage - not a "pattern" - that could have been due
to growing marijuana; however, that one spike was close in time to when the detective and Karin
Mitchell smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Beavers' property on August 12, 2006. (R.,
pp.108-109; Supp. R., pp.953, 958.)
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When the "odor" evidence in this case is combined with the other evidence
presented to the magistrate - the Spokane DEA agent's tip [that the smell of
marijuana had been detected during an earlier investigation], rumors of a grow
operation, a one-time spike [vis-a-vis a pattern of spikes] in the time period of
detecting an "odor," Defendant's strange activity [of not letting people come onto
his property], Defendant's lack of reported income, the presence of greenhouses, a
prior drug charge, etc. - the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in finding
probable cause to believe Defendant was growing marijuana under the totality of
the remaining evidence. Thus, the search warrant in this case was valid, even
without any evidence of any alleged pattern in the Defendant's power usage.
(Supp. R., pp.957-958 (emphasis original).)

3.

Post-Conviction Proceeding And Evidentiary Hearing

In his post-conviction petition, Beavers alleged that his "second defense attorney, Fred
Loats, failed to retain an expert witness to testify [at the Frank's hearing] on technical issues
regarding the probability of smelling marijuana under the conditions that existed at the time of
Det. Paulls' [sic] claim." (Supp. R., p.426 (explanation added).) After summarily dismissing all
but one claim (Supp. R., pp.1758-1771), the district court conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing
on Beavers' claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert to testify
about the possibility that Detective Paull could smell the odor of marijuana emanating from
Beavers' property (see generally 3/21/17 Tr.).
At the evidentiary hearing, Beavers testified that his first trial attorney, Monica FloodBrennan, had intended to use an expert, Elliott Briggs, to testify at trial about the identity of the
foreign material that had been seized as marijuana. (3/21/17 Tr., p.24, L.9-p.25, L.10.) Beavers
also testified that he requested his second trial attorney, Fred Loats, to retain Chris Conrad to testify
as an expert on the odor of marijuana. (3/21/17 Tr., p.26, Ls.3-20.) Mr. Briggs testified that after
he was contacted about Beavers' case (nine years before the evidentiary hearing), he received a
draft affidavit from Ms. Flood-Brennan, but it had incorrectly designated him as a "pathologist"
15

instead of a "toxicologist," so he sent it back unsigned with the proper corrections, but never
received it back. (3/21/17 Tr., p.40, L.11 - p.41, L. 13.) Mr. Briggs said that he was not an expert
in the cultivation of marijuana, nor was he an expert on the "odor" of marijuana, and agreed that
he "would be the wrong expert to retain if the issue was the odor of marijuana." (3/21/17 Tr., p.40,
L.6 - p.42, L. 7.) However, Mr. Briggs recalled that he had gone to the evidence room (presumably
nine years earlier) "with regard to the marijuana in this case," and as "a child of the sixties" was
able to detect the odor of marijuana, which was apparently so strong that, as he explained, "[w]hen
I got home, my wife told me that I had to change clothes out in the garage because the odor was

repulsive to her." (3/21/17 Tr., p.43, L.18 - p.45, L.8.)
Christopher Conrad testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had been qualified as an
expert on the issue of marijuana odor "[ s]ix times in California courts, once in Oregon and once
in federal court." (3/21/17 Tr., p.49, L.12 - p.50, L.11.) He opined that an expert witness would
have been "helpful" to Beavers in discrediting Detective Paull's testimony (at the Franks hearing)
that he could detect the odor of marijuana emanating from Beavers' property. (3/21/17 Tr., p.51,
L.18 - p.52, L.10.) Mr. Conrad based his conclusion, in part, on his opinion that "young cannabis
plants have far more generic plant odor," and flowering (budding) and resin-producing plants have
a "strong distinctive odor." (3/21/17 Tr., p.52, L.11 - p.53, L.20.)

Mr. Conrad also relied on

statements from Beavers, and his (Conrad's) review of photos of Beavers' ventilation and filtration
air systems to opine that "an expert would have been helpful in arguing that there would have been
little or no odor to come from those." (3/21/17 Tr., p.52, Ls.19-25.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Conrad explained that "terpenes" cause the smell of marijuana,
and when asked it "trace amounts" of terpenes would have a "distinct rather pungent odor," he
explained that it would depend on the specific strains of marijuana, that some strains smell stronger
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than others, and acknowledged that he did not "know what type of strain these plants were."
(3/21/17 Tr., p.61, L.18 -p.62, L.12.) Mr. Conrad testified, "[t]here's a strain that's called skunk
because of how much it smells like a skunk." (3/21/17 Tr., p.54, Ls.11-14.) Mr. Conrad testified
that he became a marijuana defense expert after California "legalized marijuana in 1996," 8 he has
testified in California about 350 times, but he is not listed in any expert witness registries, he does
not advertise, and he relies on word-of-mouth and publicity from books he has written to get his
name out to defense attorneys. (3/21/17 Tr., p.63, Ls.3-18.)
The state presented testimony by Beavers' neighbor, Karin Mitchell, who explained that
her house's backyard backed up to Beavers' backyard. (3/21/17 Tr., p.71, Ls.2-5.) Ms. Mitchell
said that it she noticed an odor coming from Beavers' property that "smelled like skunk," and
which "progressively got worse over the ... few years that [she] lived down there." (3/21/17 Tr.,
p.71, Ls.6-23.) Ms. Mitchell recalled that, on the day a detective came to her house to investigate
the odor, the odor was still present - and she was familiar with the odor of marijuana from "past
experience." (3/21/17 Tr., p.71, L.24-p.72, L.18.) On cross-examination, Ms. Mitchell explained
that the odor was off and on "year-around," and "there was one time where the whole - my entire
house smelled like pot. I mean, my kids smelled it. I smelled it." (3/21/17 Tr., p.73, Ls.4-10.)
When asked why she had testified (on direct examination) that she "later found out that it was
marijuana," and "[w]ho told you that it was marijuana that you were smelling?" she answered that
her husband and her brother-in-law had told her, and that she "wanted it verified ... because [she]
thought it was, but [she] wasn't for sure." (3/21/17 Tr., p.73, L.17 - p.74, L.7.) She further

8

Mr. Conrad obviously was referring to "medical" marijuana, not recreational use of marijuana.
"California would later become the first state to legalize medical cannabis with the passage of the
Compassionate Use Act of 1996 (Proposition 215)." Cannabis in California, Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, https ://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Cannabis_in_California.
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explained:
I had a funny feeling it was, but I mean, it smelled like skunk. And I was
like, well, no, that doesn't smell like skunk. Then I was like, no, that's pot.
(3/21/17 Tr., 73, L.25 - p.74, L.3.)
Next, Beavers' second trial counsel, Mr. Loats, testified that the magistrate represented at
the probable cause hearing that if either the utility bill spikes or "odor" evidence had been lacking,
he would not have found probable cause to issue the search warrant. (3/21/17 Tr., p.77, L.7 -p.78,
L.9.) Accordingly, Mr. Loats' strategy at the Franks hearing was to challenge only the utility bill
spikes, which he succeeded at doing. (Id.) Mr. Loats explained, "So we established that the officer
presented false testimony. We got in the utility records. But despite that, Judge Hosack found the
smell alone was enough to justify issuance of the warrant." (3/21/17 Tr., p.78, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Loats
recalled seeing an unsigned affidavit of Elliot Briggs prepared by Ms. Flood-Brennan, but a review
of his case notes indicated that he attempted to contact Mr. Briggs to no avail. (3/21/17 Tr., p.79,
Ls.9-23.) Mr. Loats testified that, at that time, he had never heard of Chris Conrad, nor was he
aware (other than of Mr. Briggs) of"any expert with regards to the odor of marijuana." (3/21/17
Tr., p.80, L.4 - p.82, L.10.)
The state also presented the testimony of three law enforcement officers. First, I.S.P.
Detective Cloyd Huff testified that he primarily worked narcotics cases, including between 50 to
100 marijuana cases, and had experience with marijuana plants that "were in the state prior to
where they're budding or flowering." (3/21/17 Tr., p.83, L.19 - p.84, L.13.) According to
Detective Huff, such plants have an odor, a "unique smell, sometimes sweet, sometimes skunky."
(3/21/17 Tr., p.84, Ls.11-23; see id., p.85, L.3 - p.86, L.7.) Next, Kootenai County Sheriffs
Sergeant Eric Hildebrandt, supervisor for the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force under the
F.B.I., testified that he had investigated hundreds of marijuana cases, and that, in his experience,
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marijuana plants "always smell" and have an odor that is "strong" and "distinctive." (3/21/17 Tr.,
p.89, L.5 - p.91, L.3.)

Lastly, F.B.I. Special Agent Edward Jacobson testified that he was

coordinator for the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force, which investigates marijuana crimes,
and was involved with the August 2006 execution of the search warrant on Beavers' home.
(3/21/17 Tr., p.98, L.6 - p.99, L.7.) Special Agent Jacobson testified that the odor of marijuana
was extreme when he removed the greenhouse plants, "so extreme [he] actually had a headache
from the odor." (3/21/17 Tr., p.100, Ls.1-14.)
After the evidentiary hearing and the submission of written closing arguments, the district
court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, holding Beavers failed to establish,
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), that his trial counsel's performance at the
Franks hearing was either deficient or prejudicial. (Supp. R., pp.1758-1771.)

4.

Beavers Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Ruling

The district court held that Beavers' trial counsel was not deficient; rather, he made a
tactical decision9 to try to discredit Detective Paull's testimony through cross-examination at the
Franks hearing, and that Mr. Briggs "could not have provided expert testimony to rebut Paull' s

9

The post-conviction court explained:
Loats' strategy during the [Franks] hearing was to establish that the officer
presented "false testimony" to the Court regarding utility records when he sought
the search warrant of the home. Loats believed that Judge Wayman relied on two
pieces of evidence to find probable cause: the utility records that were presented
and the officer's testimony. Thus, at the motion to suppress, Loats' strategy was to
establish that the officer testified falsely or recklessly regarding the utility records.

(R., pp.220-221 (explanation added); see R., p.111-112 ("That [utility usage], coupled with your
own personal observation of using your senses of smelling the distinctive smell of growing
marijuana ... does add up to a probable cause determination to allow the issuance of the search
warrant here.")
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testimony" because he "testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was not an expert with respect
to the odor of marijuana." (R., p.224.) The court also noted that trial counsel testified "he had not
heard of any experts on the issue of the odor of marijuana at the time of Beavers' pretrial hearings."

(Id.)
Karin Mitchell, Beavers' neighbor, testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing that
at many times in the past few years she detected a "skunk" smell she believed to be marijuana
coming from Beavers' property, including the same day Detective Paull went to her house and
smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Beavers' property - one day before the search warrant
issued. (3/21/17 Tr., p.71, L.4-p.72, L.18.) The court also held that, even if Beavers' trial counsel
was deficient for failing to present a marijuana odor expert to testify at the Franks hearing, Beavers
suffered no prejudice under Strickland:
[The Franks hearing judge's] memorandum opinion explains that several other
factors were relied upon to determine that there was probable cause to issue the
search warrant based upon the totality of the circumstances. These factors included
the Detective's testimony regarding the odor of marijuana, the neighbor's
testimony regarding the odor of marijuana, a DEA informant's tip and other
evidence. [l 01 Thus, the Petitioner cannot establish the outcome of this case would
have been different but for [trial counsel's] failure to present an expert on the odor
of marijuana.
(R., p.225.)
The state incorporates, as if fully set forth herein, the district court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order (R., pp.215-227, attached as Appendix B), for part of its response

10

Detective Paull testified that he was contacted by a DEA agent from Spokane who told him that
he had received a tip that Beavers was going to a "grow store" in Spokane, and "[t]hey had done
some surveillance into the house and were able to get a large whiff or smell of growing marijuana."
(R., p.103 .) The detective also testified there was "some strange activity at the house," that
Beavers keeps to himself and confronts people who get close to his property, "including kids to
get their balls back." (R., p.108.) The DEA also obtained Beavers' tax history, which revealed
that, despite owning three vehicles, several boats, and a house, he had no reportable income during
the previous five years. (R., p.109-110.)
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to Beavers' argument as it pertains to the possible testimony of Mr. Briggs, Mr. Conrad, or any
other "marijuana odor" expert at the Franks hearing.
Beavers does not argue that the district court erred in finding that his trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to call Mr. Briggs to testify at the Franks hearing - Mr. Briggs conceded he
was not an expert on the ability to detect marijuana odor. (3/21/17 Tr., p.40, L.6 - p.42, L.7; see
Appellant's Brief, pp.20-23.) Rather, Beavers points out that, although the court summarized Mr.
Conrad's testimony, it did not reach any conclusions specific to his testimony.

(Id., p.20.)

However, by dismissing Beavers' claim after the evidentiary hearing, the court implicitly rejected
his claim as it relates to Mr. Conrad or any other expert. See Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,
617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982). Appellate courts will "give due deference to any implicit findings
of the trial court supported by substantial evidence." 11 State v. Yeager, 139 Idaho 680, 684, 85
P.3d 656,660 (2004) (citing State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998).
Beavers was required to prove that his trial counsel's performance was both deficient and
prejudicial under Strickland for failing to obtain an expert to testify at the Franks hearing about
the likelihood that Detective Paull could smell the odor of marijuana emanating from Beavers'
property. Such alleged deficient performance and prejudice must be viewed in light of trial
counsel's task of succeeding at the Franks hearing - which required him to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Detective Paull's testimony about being able to smell

Even if this Court determines that the district court made no implicit finding about Mr. Conrad's
testimony, its order dismissing Beavers' ineffectiveness claim may be upheld in regard to Mr.
Conrad on the alternative ground that Beavers failed to meet his burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present testimony
by a marijuana odor expert at the Franks hearing. See I.C.R. 57(c); Estes, 111 Idaho at 436, 725
P.2d at 141; State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448,450, 807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991)(on appellate
review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on any theory).
11
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marijuana coming from Beavers' property was not only false, but that such falsity was made
intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth. State v. Peterson, 133 Idaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d
1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 1999). Under Franks, mere negligence in the course of acquiring a warrant
on the part of law enforcement does not provide a sufficient basis to rescind a warrant and render
a search or arrest invalid. It is not nearly enough that Mr. Conrad might have "helped" Beavers'
argument or that he would have "discredited" Detective Paull's testimony - he (along with other
testimony) was required to show the detective's testimony was false, and that such falsity was
done either intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth. Franks, 458 U.S. at 155-56;
Lindner, 100 Idaho at 41, 592 P.2d at 856.
Beavers has failed to show deficient performance, much less prejudice, in his trial counsel's
alleged failure to have Mr. Conrad (or another expert) testify at the Franks hearing that Detective
Paull could not have detected the odor of marijuana from the fence-line bordering Beavers'
property and Ms. Mitchell's property.
Despite Beavers' contrary testimony, Mr. Loats testified that he had never heard of Mr.
Conrad, nor was he aware of any experts on marijuana odor at the time he represented Beavers.
(3/21/17 Tr., p.80, L.4 - p.81, L.10.) Mr. Conrad, who the court described as "a consultant from
California" (R., p.219), testified that he did not list himself in any expert witness registries, did not
advertise, and he relied on word-of-mouth and publicity from books he has written to get his name
out to defense attorneys (3/21 /l 7 Tr., p.63, Ls.3-18). How Mr. Loats could have been "deficient"
for not knowing about Mr. Conrad's "marijuana odor" expert testimony services is unexplainable.
For the following reasons, even if Mr. Loats had known about Mr. Conrad's witness service, he
would not have been deficient for not utilizing him as an expert at the Franks hearing to challenge
Detective Paull' s testimony.
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Karin Mitchell, Beavers' neighbor for several years, testified at the evidentiary hearing that
she had smelled a "skunk" smell emanating from his property onto hers, and, based on her
experience, she believed the odor was from marijuana. (3/21/17 Tr., p.72, L.13 - p.74, L.7.) Ms.
Mitchell explained that the odor got progressively worse over the time they lived next to Beavers.
(3/21/17 Tr., p.71, Ls.22-23.) Mr. Conrad - Beavers' own witness - inadvertently corroborated
Ms. Mitchell's testimony by explaining, "[t]here's a strain [of marijuana] that's called skunk
because of how much it smells like a skunk." 12 (3/21/17 Tr., p.54, Ls.11-14 (emphasis added).)
Ms. Mitchell's olfactory observations over the years and on the same day that Detective Paull
smelled marijuana coming from Beavers' property clearly corroborated Detective Paul's
testimony.
Despite Beavers' attempt to use Mr. Conrad to discredit the probable cause testimony of
Detective Paull, the testimony of three highly trained and experienced law enforcement officers at
the evidentiary hearing, as detailed above, undermined Mr. Conrad's testimony that there would
have been little or no odor of marijuana emanating from Beavers' property when Ms. Mitchell and
the detective claimed to have smelled it. The officers' testimony bears repeating. I.S.P. Detective
Cloyd Huff said he had worked on many marijuana cases, he had experience with marijuana plants
that "were in the state prior to where they're budding or flowering[,]" and that such plants have an
odor, a "unique smell, sometimes sweet, sometimes skunky." (3/21/17 Tr., p.83, L.19-p.86, L.7.)
Kootenai County Sheriffs Sergeant Eric Hildebrandt, who supervised the North Idaho Violent
Crimes Task Force under the F.B.I., testified that he had investigated hundreds of marijuana cases,

As previously noted, Mr. Briggs, the other expert who testified on Beavers' behalf at the
evidentiary hearing, recalled that he had gone to the evidence room and upon examining the seized
plants, he was able to detect the odor of marijuana which was so strong that"[ w]hen [he] got home,
[his] wife told [him] that [he] had to change clothes out in the garage because the odor was
repulsive to her." (3/21/17 Tr., p.43, L.18-p.45, L.8.)
12
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and, in his experience, marijuana plants "always smell" and have an odor that is "strong" and
"distinctive." (3/21/17 Tr., p.89, L.5 - p.91, L.3.) Finally, F.B.I. Special Agent Edward Jacobson,
the coordinator for the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force, helped with the 2006 execution of
the search warrant on Beavers' home, and testified that the odor of marijuana from the greenhouse
plants was "so extreme [he] actually had a headache from the odor." (3/21/17 Tr., p.98, L.6 - p.100,
L.14.)
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district
court. Peterson, 139 Idaho at 97, 73 P.3d at 110. Beavers' argument suggests that the three law
enforcement officers who testified at the evidentiary hearing were either incorrect in their
observations about the odor emitted by Beavers' grow operation and/or flower-less marijuana
plants or lacked candor. Beavers' assertion that Detective Paull testified falsely also necessarily
attempted to impugn the credibility of Karin Mitchell, who testified that, for several years, she
endured the progressively stronger "skunk" smell she believed (in her experience) to be from
marijuana on Beavers' property, and on the same day Detective Paull came to her house. (3/21/17
Tr., p.71, L.4 -p.72, L.18.) However, by its dismissal of Beavers' claim following the evidentiary
hearing, the district court indicated that the state's witnesses were more credible than Beavers'
witnesses on the issue of whether non-flowering marijuana plants have a distinctive odor, or
whether Detective Paull could have smelled marijuana coming from Beavers' property on the day
in question. If the district court had believed Mr. Conrad's testimony that non-flowering marijuana
plants do not have an odor, or very little odor, and Beavers' contention that none of the plants were
in a flowering status, it would have ruled in Beavers' favor. The district court clearly gave more
credit to the state's witnesses than either Beavers or Mr. Conrad.
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In light of the state's evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and implicitly deemed
credible, Beavers failed to show his trial counsel was deficient for failing to attempt to prove at
the Franks hearing that Detective Paull's testimony that he could smell the odor of marijuana when
he went to the fence-line of Beavers' property was false, and that the false testimony was made
either intentionally or in reckless disregard for the truth.
Additionally, Beavers has failed to demonstrate that, even if trial counsel was deficient for
not presenting testimony by an expert such as Mr. Conrad at the Franks hearing to challenge
Detective Paull's "odor" testimony, there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Aragon v. State,
114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988). In short, it would be unrealistic to conclude that
if Mr. Conrad (or another similar expert) would have testified at the Franks hearing, the district
court would have discounted the testimony of Detective Paull, Ms. Mitchell, and the three law
enforcement officers described above, as well as the other factors that led to the issuance of the
search warrant.
Through either its implicit findings or as an alternative ground (see n.11, supra), the district
court correctly dismissed Beavers' claim as it relates to Mr. Conrad. Based on the testimony the
district court deemed more credible, and the heavy burden trial counsel would have in proving
Detective Paull' s "marijuana odor" testimony was either an intentionally or recklessly false falsity,
the district court properly dismissed Beavers' claim. Beavers failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that his trial counsel's performance was either deficient or prejudicial for failing
to utilize an expert such as Mr. Conrad at the Franks hearing to discredit Detective Paull' s
testimony.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order dismissing
Beavers' post-conviction petition.
DATED this 23 rd day of May, 2018.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23 rd day of May, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy to:
BEN P. McGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ John C. McKinney
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
JCM/vr
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT O:F THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)
)
)

MARK D. BEAVERS,
,.-.

Petitioner,

)

V,

)
)

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO, CV 2012-2656
FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
ANO ORDER

This matter came on before the Court on an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The Petitioner was represented by Edward Lawlor,

attorney at law. The Respondent was represented by Bryant Bushling, Kootenai County
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. The evidentiaty hearing took place on March 21 and 22,
2017. The Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision.

BACKGROUND
The Petitioner filed this timely Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief
on August 5, 2012. The Respondent's Motion for Sununary Disposition was filed on

May 15, 2013 and October 30, 2013. The Petitioner filed a Brief in Response to State's
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Motion for Summary Dismissal on December 22, 2014. In the underlying c:riminal case,
the Petitioner was charged with trafficking in marijuana and possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver, The Petitioner was found guilty of each of the charged
offenses. The facts of this case and another case which followed these charges can be
found in the Court of Appeals opinion State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180, 268 P.3d 1 (Ct.
App. 2010).
An Opinion and Order on Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal was filed

on January 27, 2015. The Court granted the State's motion to summarily dismiss all
claims set forth in the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, with the exception of Claim
9(f), whether Attorney Loats was ineffective for failing to present an expert witness
regarding the probability of smelling marijua.."1a. Evidence on this issue was presented at
the evidentiary hearing.

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedw·e Acti a person sentenced for a
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution
of the United States or the constitution or laws of thls state;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence;
(3) TI1at the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) TI1t1t there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentencn in the
interest of justice;
(5) That his sentente has expired, his probation, or conditional release was
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint;
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy,
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LC.§ 19-490l(a).
A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time \Vithin one (1) year
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the detennination of an appeal or :from
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later.1' I.C. § 194902(a).
A petition for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding distinct from the
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709,
711, 905 P.2d 642, 644 (Ct. App.1995). "An application for post-conviction relief
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature," Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,
287, 912 P.2d 653, 655 (Ct. App.1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction
relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with
the petition. I. C. § 19-4903 ." Id.
The petitioner seeking post-conviction relief bears the burden of pleading and
proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and then prove by
a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim for relief."

Martinez v. State> 125 Idaho 844,846,875 P.2d 941,943 (Ct. App.1994).
Under LC, § 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However,
''(s]ummary dismissal is pennissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no
genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
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petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 ldah• at 287, 912 'P .2d at 655. "If

the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, 127

[daho at 711, 905 P.2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation,
unsubstantiated by any fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary
hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App.1986).

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Petitioner was represented by three attorneys in the underlying criminal
matter. Attorney Monica Flood~Brennan was first to represent hi.m. When she
withdrew from the case, the Petitioner hired attorney Fred Loats. Loats was
Beavers' attorney during the time that the issue in this case arises.

2. Petitioner Beavers testified at the evidentiary hearing. He reviewed photos from
the day of his arrest. He identified marijuana plants that were not flowering,
which he stated do not emit a sufficiently distinct odor to be detected as alleged
in this case. He also testified the greenhouses at his residence were equipped
with activated charcoal filters and that fans were in continuous use up to the time

of his arrest for the purpose of exchanging air.
3. In the underlying criminal matter, Beavers filed to affidavits in support of the

motion to suppress, for the purpose of expressing that it was extremely
improbable that anyone not standing on the property could smell the odor of
marijuana. He stated that the filters were changed out every couple of weeks.
4. Beavers testified he spoke with his first attorney, Monica Flood-Brennan ab•ut
the need to hire an expert to testify regarding identifying marijuana by smell.
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Flood~Brennan attempted to hire and expert but the first ope she contacted was
too expensive. She then contacted Elliott Briggs, whom Beavers settled for as an
expert; but he also was not retained. Beavers then fired Flood-Brennan as his

counsel and hired Fred Loats.
5. Beavers testified he asked Loats to retain Chris Conrad, who Beavers believed
was the leading expert regarding identifying marijuana by smell. Beavers states
that Loats claimed an expert wa$ not needed and that he would rely on crossexamination of the state's expert,
6. Elliott Briggs is a consultant in forensic toxicology from Spokane, Washington.
While Monica Flood-Brennan was representing Beavers, her investigator had

Mr. Briggs review the marijuana evidence at the Coeur d'Alene police
department. The evidence was reviewed on June 11, 2008. Briggs prepared a
report (See Exhibit 2.) Briggs' report indicated that contrary to Mr. Beaver's

claims, the first bag of marijuana he observed had "a characteristic marijuana
odor" and that "multiple1 recognizable marijuana buds were present in the bag."
On cross exam Mt. Briggs testified the evidence smelled like marijuana and

when he returned home his wife required him to change clothes in the garage
because of the smell on his clothes, He also testified he never received an

Finally, he

affidavit that had been prepared by Attorney Flood-Brennan.

confirmed he was not an expert with respect to the odor of marijuana.
7. Chris Conrad is a consultant from California who has testified about marijuana
odor and has been an expert on marijuana cultivation. He testified that he
believes an expert would have been helpful for purposes of discrediting
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Detective Paull' s testimony at the suppression hearing. Conrad explained that
young plants have less odor and that the odor of marijuana is stronger if plants
are flowering. He testified if he had been hired he would have gone to the house
and inspected both the greenhouse and the home. Such inspection would have
allowed for him to testify with respect to the filtration system and whether odor

was ascertainable if standip_g at neighbo1ing property. He testified the odor of
marijuana pla,.1.ts is dependent upon the strain of the marijuana and he did not
know what strain the plants in question were.
8. Karen Mitchell was Beavers' neighbor at the time he was arrested. Her backyard
shared a boundary line with Beavers' back yard, She testified that she was

familiar with the odor of marijuana from past experience. According to Mitchell,
Beavers' back yard 11 smelled like skunk" and that it got worse over time. 'W'hen
the detective came to her house, the odor was present that day.
9. Fred Loats was the second attorney hired to represent Mark Beavers, after Flood~
Brennan was fired by Beavers. Sixty percent of Loats' practice is criminal
defense. He has handled hundreds of cases involving growing, selling, and
possessing marijuana.
10. Loats represented Beavers during the motion to suppress or Franks hearing that
was held on July 19, 2007. Loats' strategy during the hearing was to establish
that the officer presented '1false testimony" to the Court regarding utility record.s

when he sought the search warrant of the home, Loats believed that Judge
Waymon relied on two pieces of evidence to find probable cause: the utility
records that were presented and the officer)s testimony. Thus, at the motion to
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suppress, Loats' strategy was to establish that the officer testified falsely or

recklessly regarding the utility records.
11, Loats was aware that Beavers was adamant that the officer could not have
smelled green marijuana emanating from the residence. Loats was aware there
was an unsigned affidavit that Flood-Brennan had prepared for Elliott Briggs.
He made efforts to contact Briggs 1 but based upon his notes of the case he could
find nothing to indicate contact had been made. At the time of this case, Loats
was unaware of any cases where reliance on the lack of odor of marijuana was
sufficient to overturn probable cause.

12. Loats testified that he is unaware whether Briggs was an expert regarding the
odor of marijuana because he never spoke with him. Loats made no attempt to
find another expert, but he did not know any experts regarding odor at that time.
13. When asked about how you rebut an expert's testimony) Loats explained that
you can have your own expert, but that a second way is to impeach the State's
expert Impeachment can be based upon the background of the expert o;r biases

the expert may have,
14. Floyd Huff) an Idaho State Police Detective 1 has investigated about 1500
rnariJuana cases and he has encountered marijuana at all stages of growth. He
testifad that marijuana plants in the stages of growth before budding or
flowering do have an odor and that marijuana has a unique smell. When asked to
review a picture of the marijuana that was the subject of the arrest, Huff testified
that plants like those would have an odor.
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15. Eric Hildebrandt, a sergeant with the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office, testified
that he has been involved in hundreds of cases with marijuana, He also testified
that rnarijuann has an odor even when not flowering, and that all grows have a
strong odor.
16. Edward Jacobson, cu1Tently a special agent with the FBI, was involved with the
execution of the search warrant on Beavers' prope,rty. He assisted Detective
Paull. Jacobson testified that during the execution of the search warrant, he
smelled growing marijuana in the house, in the basement. He also participated in
removing the marijuana p1ants from the greenhouse. According to Jacobson,
there was an extreme odor of marijuana in the greenhouse.

ANALYSIS
lneffecti,ve assistance of counsel claims are appropriately brought pursuant to the
UPCP A. The Court applies the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington when
determining whether counsel provided ineffective assistance.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought
under the post-conviction procedure act Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,
924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct.App.1992). To prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the
attorney1s perfo1mance was deficient and that the defendant was
prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S, 668,
687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-94 (1984); Hassett v. State,
127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App.1995), To establish a
deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon
v, State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish
prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for
the attorney's deficient perfonnance, the outcome of the trial would have
been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. This Court has
long-adhered to the preposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial
counsel will not be secood-guess(;d on appeal unless those decisions are
based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other
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shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho
231, 233> 880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct.App.1994).

Barce!la v. State, 148 Idaho 469,477,224 P.3d 536,544 (Ct. App. 2009).
There is a single issue before the Court, whether the second defense attomey1
Fred Loats, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to retain/present an
expert witness to testify on technical issues regarding the probability of smelling
marijuana under the conditions that existed at the ti.nte of Detective Paull' s claim he
could smell an odor of marijuana coming from the property, The magistrate court relied

on Detective Paull's claims in order to issue a search warrant As a result of the search,
approximately 45 marijuana plants were located in greenhouses in the Petitioner's back
yard and thus, the Petitioner was charged with trafficking in marijuana and possession of
marijuana with intent to deliver.

A motion to suppress was filed in the criminal case. Judge Hosack issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order in Re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to
Dismiss, filed September 17> 2007, in the underlying criminal case. 1 Judge Hosack
detennined that Beavers had met his burden of showing that it was probable that Officer
Paull's oral affidavit was false and/or made in reckless disregard sufficient to allow for a

Franks hearing on the basis that Detective Paull made certain statements regarding
Beaver's power usage over the past five years which were false and reflected a reckless

disregard for truth and accuracy. Memorandum Decision at 5. However, Judge Hosack

deterntlned that the magistrate judge correctly concluded there was probable cause to
issue the search waxrap.t based upon several other factors, including Paull's testimony
regarding the odor of marijuana, the neighbor's detection of the odor ofma,rijuana, a
1 Ulis

Court takes Judicial notice of the underlying criminal case, Kootenai County Case CR-F06-l 88 l3.
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DEA informant's tip, and other evidence of the totality of the circumstances. Id, at 1011. In this opinion Judge Hosack stated, "This Court finds that the Defendant did not
meet his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Officer Paull' s
testimony that he smelled the odor of marijuana was false," Memorandum Decision and

Order in re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Motion to Dismiss, at B. Judge Hosack
noted that the Defendant did not call any witnesses. Id. at 4.
The PetiHonei: claims counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert who
was a witness regarding the odor of marijuana in order to rebut Detective Pauli's
testimony. The Petitioner asserts the expert could have testified in a manner that would
have discredited Pau!Ps testimony. The Petitioner's claim calls into question the strategy
that Loats applied at the Franks hearing. Loats testified regarding his strategy at this
hearing, which involved discrediting Detective Paull through cross-examination. Be also
explained that while he discussed hiring an expert with Beavers, his records indicate that
he had not been in contact with Mr. Briggs. Regardless, even if contact had been made,
Briggs testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was not an expert with respect to the
odor of marijuana. Thus, Briggs could not have provided expert testimony to rebut
Pauli's testimony.
Loats also testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had not heard of any experts
on the issue of the odor of marijuana at the time of Beavers' pretrial hearings. Further, a
review of the record indicates that the presiding judge not only considered the testimony
from Detective Paull, but also others in connection with the case.
The burden is on the Petitioner to establish ineffective assistance of counsel as set
forth in Strickland v. Washington. "[S)trategic decisions of trial counsel will not be
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second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation;
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard

v. State, 12<5 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct.App.1994). The decisions made by
Loats were sound strategic decisions 1 based upon adequate preparation and knowledge of
the law at that time, Further, as noted above, even if Loats had presented Briggs as an
expert witness, Briggs testified at the hearing before this Court that he is not an expert
with respect to the odor of marijuana.

Finally, even if the Petitioner had shown trial counsel was ineffective) the record
establishes that the Petitioner was not biased as a result of failing to present an expert
\l..iitness. Judge Hosack's memorandum opinion explains that several other factors were
relied upon to determine that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant based
upon the totality of1he circumstances. These factors included the Detective's testimony
regai:ding the odor of marijuana1 ilie neighbor~s testimony regarding the odor of
marijuana, a DEA infonnant's tip and other evidence. Thus, the Petitioner cannot
establish the outcome of this case would have been different but for Loats• failure to
present an expert on the odor of marijuana.
Based upon the record as a whole, the Petitioner has failed to establish that
counsel was deficient in his representation and that but for the deficiency, the outcome of
his case would have been different. Therefore> the remaining claim of the Petitioner's
motion is dismissed. In conjunction with this Court's prior ruling, the Petition for Postw
Conviction Relief is dismissed in its entirety.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of
establishing ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to the test set forth in Strickland v.

Washington. Therefore, the sole issue remaining in the Petition for Post~Conviction relief
ls dismissed. Consequently the Petition fqr Post-Conviction Relief is dismissed in its
entirety.

ORDER
The Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DENIED,

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ~ a y of May 2017.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER was:

--- hand delivered via court basket or
1

/l[t

faxed and mailed, postage prepaid, by the undetsigned at Lewiston, Idaho,
this ~ day of May, 2017, to:
Edward J. Lawlor
PO Box 3918
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816

Kootenai County Prosecutor.CV
PO Box: 9000
Coeur d'Alene ID 83816
Clerk of the Court
Kootenai County
Fax: (208) 446-1194
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